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COMMENTS
QUI TAM SUITS UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986: THE NEED
FOR CLEAR LEGISLATIVE EXPRESSION
Congress developed the False Claims Act (the Act)' to strengthen the
ability of the federal government to expose false claims against it and prose-
cute the wrongdoer.2 First enacted during the Civil War, the Act allowed a
private party to bring suit, in the name of the government, based on the
individual's independent knowledge of fraud.3 The qui tam suit, as the pri-
vate party's action is referred to, awarded the qui tam plaintiff, or relator, a
portion of the money judgment for a successful suit.' After initial popular-
ity, qui tam actions under the Act fell into disuse and disfavor in the late
1800's and early 1900's,5 but were revived under the False Claims Amend-
ments Act of 1986 (1986 Amendments).6 The 1986 Amendments, enacted
by Congress to combat mounting fraud by government contractors, 7 in-
creased the award percentage that a successful relator could enjoy and re-
moved some previously imposed restrictions on bringing suit.'
The drafters of the 1986 Amendments, while attempting to give the qui
tam relator more authority to bring an action, were wary of past abuses
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988).
2. The False Claims Act was viewed as a weapon "to enhance the Government's ability
to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government." S. REP. No. 345,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266 [hereinafter 1986
SENATE REPORT].
3. Id. at 5273-75.
4. Id. at 5275; Comment, Qui Tam Suits Under the Federal False Claims Act: Tool of the
Private Litigant in Public Actions, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 446, 454-55 (1972) [hereinafter Tool of
the Private Litigant].
5. Patrick W. Hanifin, Qui Tam Suits by Federal Government Employees Based on Gov-
ernment Information, 20 PuB. CONT. L.J. 557, 563-64 (1990).
6. Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986).
7. "In 1984, the Department of Defense conducted 2,311 fraud investigations, up 30
percent from 1982 .... In 1985, the Department of Defense Inspector General ... testified that
45 of the 100 largest defense contractors, including 9 of the top 10, were under investigation
for multiple fraud offenses." 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5267.
8. Id. at 5278-82.
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under the Act.' Private parties would often base their suits on criminal in-
dictments filed by the federal government, creating "a race to the courthouse
between the Government's civil lawyers and private parties."'" In such
cases, the monetary incentive for private parties to bring qui tam actions
interfered with the government's mandate to handle criminal and civil ac-
tions. The Supreme Court's 1943 ruling in United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess 12 supported these "parasitical" actions-suits based on information
made public by the government-by holding that the Act did not require the
relator to base his suit on original information.' 3 In response to Marcus,
Congress amended the Act in 1943 to require that qui tam relators base their
suits on information not already in possession of the government.' 4 The
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 sought to ease that restriction by
allowing a relator to file suit if he was the "original source" of the
information.' 5
The 1986 Amendments, while furthering the goal of encouraging private
parties to pursue fraud, has had mixed success. Although the amount of
civil recoveries under the Act has more than doubled,16 there have been seri-
9. See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text. During the 1940's, numerous qui tam
actions were brought by relators who based their suits on information possessed by the federal
government, contrary to the intent of the statute. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at
5275.
10. Id. at 5275-76.
11. Commenting on the False Claims Act as it existed prior to 1943, Justice Jackson
observed:
(T]here is nothing in the text or history of this statute which indicates to me that
Congress intended to enrich a mere busybody who copies a Government's indictment
as his own complaint and who brings to light no frauds not already disclosed and no
injury to the Treasury not already in process of vindication.
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 534, 558 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
12. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
13. Id. at 545-48.
14. False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608, 608-09 (1943).
15. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3730, 100 Stat. 3153,
3157 (1986). Representative Berman, a sponsor of the 1986 Amendments, stated that "[a]
person is an original source if he had some of the information related to the claim which he
made available to the government or the news media in advance of the false claim being pub-
licly disclosed." 132 CONG. REC. 29322 (1986).
16. H.R. REP. No. 837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1992) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 837].
The 1986 Amendments have significantly increased the amount of recoveries in civil actions
undertaken by the federal government. In 1985, the government recovered $27 million, $54
million in 1986, $83 million in 1987, $176 million in 1988, and $225 million in 1989. Qui Tam
Provisions of the False Claims Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of Admin. Law and Gov't
Relations of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1990) [hereinafter Hear-
ings] (statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).
The Department of Justice reported recoveries of $257 million in 1990 and $340 million in
1991 for suits involving fraud against the government. 57 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) at 8 (Jan. 6,
1992).
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ous shortcomings. The federal government has found itself arguing against
numerous qui tam relators, stating that the private claims undercut federal
civil and criminal actions.1 7 Government employees, who were previously
barred from filing a qui tam suit based on information learned during the
course of their employment, have maintained successful suits despite pro-
tests by the federal government.18 Federal courts, faced with a paucity of
legislative history under the 1986 Amendments, have unevenly interpreted
the statutory language.19 As a result, many courts permit previously forbid-
den relators to sue under the Act while forbidding seemingly qualified qui
tam plaintiffs from bringing a suit.
20
This Comment traces the development of qui tam actions under the False
Claims Act, focusing on the problems that have arisen as a result of the
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986. The Comment examines the legisla-
tive intent behind the 1986 Amendments and the subsequent interpretation
of the Amendments by the federal courts. The Comment presents two con-
trasting viewpoints adopted by the federal courts in applying the False
Claims Act: a restrictive view that limits otherwise qualified relators and a
more moderate view that expands the opportunity for a potential relator to
bring a qui tam suit. The Comment then examines two proposed legislative
amendments to the False Claims Act and their potential impact on prior
case holdings. The Comment concludes that one of the legislative proposals
more directly addresses the original intent of Congress in the 1986 Amend-
ments-to encourage private citizens to serve as a conduit to the govern-
ment's fight against fraud.
17. See United States ex reL. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 319-21 (2d Cir. 1992)
(Government asserting that relator who gained information as result of government investiga-
tion was barred by False Claims Act); United States ex rel. Erickson v. American Inst. of
Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 910 (E.D. Va. 1989) (Government arguing that legisla-
tive history of the False Claims Act prohibited relator's qui tam suit). But cf United States ex
rel. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992) (government declining to inter-
vene in relator's qui tam suit).
18. See United States ex reL. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States ex reL. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I11 S.
Ct. 1312 (1991).
19. See discussion infra part II.
20. Compare United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1419, 1159-60 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that "public disclosure" under the Act
included information from discovery) with United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bus-
tamante v. Provident Life & Accident Ins., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (noting
that "Congress was very specific in choosing the appropriate wording of the statute").
1993]
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I. THE Qui TAM ACTION
The term "qui tam" is taken from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitor," which translates to "who sues on
behalf of the king as well as for himself."'" The action is established by
statute under which a private party brings an action against a wrongdoer for
the commission or omission of some named act. 22 The private party bring-
ing the suit, the qui tam relator, sues for himself as well as the government,
23and is entitled under the statute to a percentage of the monetary recovery.
The concept was derived from English common law, 24 although under the
nascent American system qui tam suits were more prevalent under statutory
provisions.25
A. Development of Qui Tam under the English and
American Legal Systems
The English system of qui tam suits began as a common law action al-
lowing a private party to pursue an interest on his own behalf, as well as the
crown's,2 6 and evolved into a suit authorized by statute.27 Two distinct par-
ties could bring suits as qui tam plaintiffs: injured parties and informers.
28
Injured parties were those who sought redress for wrongs they had suffered
personally.29 Parliament enacted statutes that allowed an aggrieved party to
prosecute the violator for his loss and provided for the crown to receive a
monetary fine. 3 In contrast, informers suffered no personal injury; their sole
motivation was monetary reward."' Informer suits went through a similar
development, with the informer's action eventually provided for by statute.32
21. Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83 (1972)
[hereinafter History and Development of Qui Tam] (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (1st ed. 1768)).
22. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1988) (establishing right of private party to bring civil
action under the False Claims Act).
23. Id.
24. History and Development of Qui Tam, supra note 21, at 83.
25. Id. at 94-95.
26. Id. at 85. Early qui tam suits have been characterized as actions to "obtain a common
law remedy in the royal courts for a private wrong that also affected the king's interests." Id.
27. Valerie R. Park, Note, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and the Government:
Which Is the Real Party to the Action?, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1063-64 (1991); History and
Development of Qui Tam, supra note 21, at 85-86.
28. History and Development of Qui Tam, supra note 21, at 84-85.
29. Id. at 84 n.17.
30. Id. at 86-87.
31. Id. at 84-85.
32. Id. at 88-89.
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The informer could file an indictment or a popular action 33 against the de-
fendant under the jurisdiction of a statute.34 However, the informer statutes
focused on the reward for the successful prosecution of a suit as opposed to
the provision of a remedy for the injured party. 35 With the growth of in-
former qui tam suits came various abuses under the English system includ-
ing the opportunistic prosecution of nebulous and inferior claims.36
Parliament responded to the manipulation of qui tam suits and the unfavora-
ble public reaction by limiting actions by an informer. 37 The restrictions
began as an outright ban on qui tam suits brought by informers,38 but devel-
oped into strict statutes of limitation, venue requirements, and penalties for
statutory abuses.3 9
The qui tam action was introduced to the American legal system with the
adoption of English statutory and common law by the developing Colonial
governmental and judicial structures.' American legislatures assumed and
modified many of the English qui tam provisions, 1 while American courts
employed many of the English procedural devices used to handle qui tam
suits.42 The American system made a number of changes designed to cen-
tralize in state and federal governments the authority to bring actions
against wrongdoers. By empowering the government to prosecute fraud di-
33. A "popular action" refers to "those actions which were given upon the breach of a
penal statute, and which any man that will may sue on account of the king and himself, as the
statute allowed and the case required." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 29 (6th ed. 1991).
34. History and Development of Qui Tam, supra note 21, at 87-88.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 89.
37. Id. at 89-90.
38. Id. at 89.
39. Id. at 89-91.
40. Id. at 91-97. "Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself had
no interest whatsoever in the controversy other than that given by statute, have been in exist-
ence for hundreds of years in England, and this country ever since the foundation of our
Government." Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905).
41. A number of early statutes authorized qui tam actions. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch.
5, §§ 29, 38, 1 Stat. 29, 44-45, 48 (1789) (import duties); Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 21, 1
Stat. 55, 60 (1789) (vessel registration); Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 25, § 2, §§ 3, 6, 1 Stat. 101,
102-03 (1790) (census); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124-25 (1790) (copyright
infringement); Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 24, §§ 1, 4, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (1790) (seamen regula-
tions) (codified in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137
(1790) (regulation of Indian trade); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 55, 69, 1 Stat. 145, 173, 177
(1790) (import duties); Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, §§ 8, 9, 1 Stat. 191, 195-96 (1791) (regula-
tion of the Bank of the United States); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209 (1791)
(liquor duties) (cited in Hanifin, supra note 5, at 562 n.22).
42. History and Development of Qui Tam, supra note 21, at 94-97. In Adams v. Woods, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805), the Supreme Court interpreted the language of two statutes au-
thorizing informer rewards to permit qui tam actions. "Almost every fine or forfeiture under a
penal statute, may be recovered by an action of debt [by a qui tam plaintiff] as well as by
information [by the public prosecutor]." Id. at 341.
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rectly, abuses of qui tam statutes by informers were curtailed and the gov-
ernment retained increased prosecutorial discretion.43 By the mid-
nineteenth century, statutory restrictions and judicial monitoring acted to
decrease the rate of qui tam suits "[a]s the public agencies became more
effective."" By the advent of the Civil War, qui tam suits brought under
common law were extinct and the action existed solely by statutory grant.45
B. The Development of the False Claims Act
1. The False Claims Act
Congress adopted the False Claims Act in 1863 as a means for the federal
government to counter fraud committed by Civil War defense contractors.46
Congress sought to impose civil and criminal penalties on individuals who
submitted false claims to the government.47 The Act created liability for the
commission of certain acts against the government, such as presentation for
payment or approval of false claims against the government,48 use of false
documents to obtain payment of false claims,49 and conspiracy to defraud
the government through the presentation of false claims.5° Penalties for vio-
43. History and Development of Qui Tam, supra note 21, at 97-98.
44. Id. at 101; see also Robert W. Fischer, Jr., Comment, Qui Tam Actions: The Role of
the Private Citizen in Law Enforcement, 20 UCLA L. REV. 778, 785-86 (1973) (discussing the
legislature's ability to abolish qui tam rights as a means of limiting abuses).
45. History and Development of Qui Tam, supra note 21, at 99. There was one reported
qui tam suit under the 1863 version of the False Claims Act in which the court found that a
Treasury agent was entitled to a portion of a judgment won on behalf of the federal govern-
ment. United States v. Carlisle, 25 F. Cas. 293 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1871) (No. 14,724).
46. See 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5273; Park, supra note 27, at 1066; Tool of
the Private Litigant, supra note 4, at 453.
47. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5273. The Act "provided for both civil and
criminal penalties assessed against one who was found to knowingly have submitted a false
claim to the Government." Id.
48. The statute, prior to the 1986 Amendments, stated that an individual who shall:
make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented, for payment or ap-
proval ... any claim upon or against the Government of the United States, or any
department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudu-
lent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or ap-
proval of such claim [makes or uses false documents] ...knowing the same to
contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, or who enters into any agree-
ment, combination, or conspiracy to defraud the Government of the United States,
or any department or officer thereof, by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or
allowance of any false or fraudulent claim ...shall forfeit and pay to the United
States the sum of $2000, and, in addition, double the amount of damages which the
United States may have sustained by reason of the doing or committing such act ....
31 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Tool of the Private Litigant, supra note 4, at 452-53 (discussing the effec-
tiveness of qui tam suits in prosecuting individuals who fraudulently use or misapply federal
funds).
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lating the statute included the imposition of fines equal to double the amount
of damages sustained by the government, plus a forfeiture of $2000 for each
false claim submitted. 5' To increase the scope of the government's ability to
combat fraud, the Act provided that a private party could bring a qui tam
suit both on his behalf and the government's behalf.52 The qui tam relator
received an award of half of the damages and forfeitures as well as his costs
for the successful prosecution of a suit.53 The Act's usefulness went beyond
the prosecution of wartime fraud, and the federal government expanded its
application to counter general claims of fraud.54 Despite the promise of sub-
stantial reward for successful relators, there were few recorded cases in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,55 and actual use of the Act by
private parties was minimal.56
2. The 1943 Amendments to the False Claims Act
The Act received renewed scrutiny after the Supreme Court's decision in
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,57 which allowed a private relator to
bring suit under the False Claims Act even when the suit was based on infor-
mation and evidence obtained from the government. 58 The ruling, in es-
sence, allowed an informer to copy the government's indictment and bring a
separate qui tam suit to collect the statutory reward. 59 In response, Con-
gress amended the False Claims Act to protect the United States "against
being compelled to disclose its facts involved in any criminal prosecution it
51. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5273.
52. Tool of the Private Litigant, supra note 4, at 453 n.41 (stating that "238(B) ... pro-
vides in part that '[a qui tam] suit may be brought and carried on by any person, as well for
himself as for the United States' ").
53. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5275.
54. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544 (1943). The Court in Hess
observed that the Act was used to punish those who would " 'cheat the United States.' " Id.
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863)).
55. Tool of the Private Litigant, supra note 4, at 455.
56. Id. at 453; see also Park, supra note 27, at 1064 (asserting that the potential for abuse
caused qui tam actions to fall from favor); History and Development of Qui Tam, supra note
21, at 100 (discussing the general reduction of available general reformer provisions during the
nineteenth century).
57. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
58. Id. at 545-48.
59. The Court dismissed the government's argument that the statute forbids the use of
government information by private relators:
The government presses upon us strong arguments of policy against [allowing the
informer to utilize government information], but the entire force of these considera-
tions is directed solely at what the government thinks Congress should have done
rather than at what it did.... Conditions may have changed, but the statute has not.
Id. at 546-47.
1993]
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may have undertaken or is about to undertake."'  The 1943 Amendments
prohibited federal court jurisdiction over a suit based on information or evi-
dence in the possession of the federal government at the commencement of
the suit.6 The qui tam relator was required to disclose the information
to the Attorney General and give the government the option of bringing the
suit itself within six months of the relator's original disclosure. 62 If the gov-
ernment intervened, the court could award the private party "fair and rea-
sonable" compensation limited to one-tenth the amount of the suit's
proceeds.63 If the government chose not to join the suit, the court could
award a successful litigant one-fourth of the proceeds plus costs and reason-
able expenses.64
The 1943 Amendments reflect the development of the federal govern-
ment's ability to locate and prosecute fraud. Qui tam suits in the American
legal system evolved in parallel fashion to suits under English law.65 The
governments of England and Colonial America recognized their inabilities to
expose and prosecute fraud effectively and therefore relied upon the qui tam
relator to prosecute fraud claims. 66 The 1943 Amendments evidence Con-
gress's belief that the federal government did possess sufficient capability to
locate and handle false claims without the assistance of private relators.67
The 1943 Amendments further reveal a shift to a view of qui tam relators as
"opportunistic bounty hunters" in the wake of the Marcus decision.68 Con-
60. S. REP. No. 291, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1943), reprinted in 1943 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2-
324, 2-326 [hereinafter 1943 SENATE REPORT].
61. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5277. The Act stated that "[tihe court shall
have no jurisdiction to proceed with any such suit.., whenever it shall be made to appear that
such suit was based on upon evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or
any agency, officer or employee thereof, at the time the suits was brought." False Claims Act,
Pub. L. No. 78-213, § 3491, 57 Stat. 608, 609 (1943).
62. Section 3491, 57 Stat. at 608-09. Unlike the 1986 Amendments, no distinction was
made in the 1943 Amendments to the relator's status as an "original source" of the informa-
tion that served as the basis of the suit, and the relator was required to disclose all information
relating to a qui tam action to the federal government. See infra text accompanying notes 82-
125 (discussing the 1986 Amendments); cf 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(b) (1988) (allowing suit by
individual who had "direct and independent" knowledge of information).
63. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(b) (1988).
64. Id.
65. History and Development of Qui Tam, supra note 21, at 83-101.
66. Id. at 101.
67. 1943 SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 2-326. Congress based the restrictions on the
belief that "adequate facilities in respect to handling such matters exist and . . . adequate
investigations of fraud against the United States are being made." Id.
68. As with the 1986 Amendments, the Department of Justice pressured Congress to
amend the False Claims Act. In a letter to a member of Congress, the Attorney General
focused on the resulting harm of the Marcus decision:
The result of [Marcus] is that whenever a grand jury returns an indictment charging
fraud against the Government there may be a scramble among would-be informers to
see who can be the first to file civil suit based on the charges in the indictment. There
[Vol. 42:935
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gress was motivated by the belief that "informer suits have become mere
parasitical actions"69 that have led to an "unseemly race and scramble to the
courthouse."70
One of the effects of the 1943 Amendments was to ban qui tam suits initi-
ated by government employees.7 The Supreme Court in Marcus upheld a
literal interpretation of the False Claims Act as codified in 1863, reasoning
that the statutory language and history did not explicitly prevent suits by
government employees.72 The amended False Claims Act incorporated a
broad jurisdictional bar that prevented qui tam suits that were based on in-
formation already in the possession of the federal government, including in-
formation possessed by a government employee.73 The restriction was based
on the belief that the qui tam system under the original Act encouraged
government employees to capitalize on evidence discovered by way of their
employment.74
3. The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986
In the early 1980's, as Congress increased appropriations and spending for
government procurement, fraud committed against the government likewise
are now pending 19 such suits. In 18 of these suits the basic allegations of the in-
formers' pleadings were copied from the indictments.
89 CONG. REC. 7571 (1943).
69. United States v. Rippetoe, 178 F.2d 735, 736 (4th Cir. 1949) (quoting Letter from
Francis Biddle, Attorney General, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (set forth in
S. REP. No. 1708, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1943))).
70. 89 CONG. REC. 7572 (1943). One senator commented that qui tam suits brought
under the False Claims Act "[had] become one of the worst sources of racketeering since the
days of Al Capone in the prohibition era." Id. at 7571.
71. See Hanifin, supra note 5, at 567
72. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 546 (1943). The Court stated:
Neither the language of the statute nor its history lends support to the contention
made by respondents and the government. "Suits may be brought and carried on by
any person," says the Act, and there were no words of exception or qualification ....
The Senate sponsor of the bill explicitly pointed out that he was not offering a plan
aimed solely at rewarding the conspirator who betrays his fellows, but that even a
district attorney, who would presumably gain all knowledge of a fraud from his offi-
cial position, might sue as the informer ....
Id.
73. The statute as amended in 1943 barred suits "based upon evidence or information in
the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof." False Claims
Act, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608, 608-09 (1943).
74. One member of Congress remarked:
The temptation and the opportunity is tremendous under the present law for renego-
tiatiors, contracting officers of the various purchasing agencies of the Government,
and the agents for collectors of internal revenue to take advantage of the information
they discover in the course of the business to enrich themselves by instigating inform-
ers' suits. That is a temptation we wish to remove.
89 CONG. REC. 10849 (1943).
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continued to rise.75 A 1981 Government Accounting Office report estimated
that fraud cost the federal government between $150 and $200 million dol-
lars over a two-and-a-half-year period.76 The government focused money
and resources in an attempt to combat fraud, but concluded that its efforts
alone were not adequate to contain the mounting occurrence of fraud.77 In
1986, Congress set out to revise the False Claims Act to enhance the ability
of the federal government to prosecute fraud effectively and to provide an
incentive for private citizens with knowledge of fraud to expose the viola-
78 Fastions. The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 made changes to three
major areas of the Act's prior language: damages and awards,79 filing proce-
dures,8 o and the status of the qui tam relator.8 '
a. Damages and Awards
The Act previously had required a defendant to pay a $2,000 forfeiture
and double damages on the injury suffered by the United States as a result of
the false claim. 82 Congress increased the initial penalty to $10,000 based on
the belief that a low minimum penalty would create inequities in the level of
fines determined by district courts, and that fraudulent claims against the
75. One recent statistic cited a Justice Department study that projected levels of fraud at
one-tenth the entire federal government's budget, or $100 billion in fraud. Mark A. Thomp-
son, Stealth Law. Cashing In on Military Fraud, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1988, at 33.
76. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5268.
77. The Senate report noted that "[d]etecting fraud [was] ... very difficult without the
cooperation of individuals who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudu-
lent activity." Id. at 5269.
78. The Senate report stated the Amendments were designed "to provide the Govern-
ment's law enforcers with more effective tools ... [and] to encourage any individual knowing
of Government fraud to bring that information forward." Id. at 5266-67.
79. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3156-
57 (1986).
80. Id. § 3, 100 Stat. at 3154-55.
81. The revised language states, in relevant part:
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over any action under this section based
upon the the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or General Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the
action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an
original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, 'original source' means an individual who has
direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing
an action under this section which is based on the information.
Id. § 3, 100 Stat. at 3157.
82. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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federal government required a strong governmental response.13 In addition,
the level of damages recoverable by the government was raised to treble the
amount incurred.
8 4
The 1986 Amendments enlarged the percentage of the recovery that a re-
lator received as the result of a successful qui tam suit. The prior amend-
ments awarded the relator up to ten percent of the award when the
government intervened and took over the suit. 5 The 1986 Amendments
increased the range of the award to between fifteen and twenty-five percent,
depending upon the relator's contribution to the suit.8 6 For suits where the
qui tam plaintiff retained control, the 1986 Amendments authorized an
award of between twenty and thirty percent of the judgment, 7 increased
from an upper limit of twenty-five percent.88 Reflecting the view that pri-
vate parties should be encouraged to prosecute fraud not known by the gov-
ernment, Congress set a ten percent recovery limit for suits arising from
information publicly available through the news media or a government re-
83. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5282. The Report stated that "defrauding the
Government is serious enough to warrant an automatic forfeiture rather than leaving fine de-
terminations with district courts, possibly resulting in discretionary nominal payments." Id.
84. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
85. Id. at § 3730(c)(1).
86. Id. at § 3730(d)(1). The amended language of the False Claims Act states:
If the Government proceeds with an action brought by a person under [§ 3730](b),
such person shall, subject to the second sentence of this paragraph, receive at least 15
percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of
the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed
to the prosecution of the action.
False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3156 (1986).
87. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1988). The amended language states:
If the Government does not proceed with an action under this section, the person
bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an amount which the court
decides is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages. The amount shall
be not less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the
action or settlement and shall be paid out of such proceeds. Such person shall also
receive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been neces-
sarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. All such expenses, fees,
and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.
False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3156-57
(1986).
88. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2).
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port. 9 Successful relators were also awarded expenses and attorney's fees
under the 1986 Amendments. 90
b. Filing Procedures
Congress amended the False Claims Act with the stated intent of generat-
ing more private suits, but changed the filing procedures to ensure that the
federal government would not fall victim to historical abuses of the qui tam
suit.9 ' The 1986 Amendments contained filing procedures that gave the fed-
eral government greater control over its level of involvement in a qui tam
suit. 92 Congress enacted the legislation in response to Justice Department
concerns that the potential overlap of private and government suits could
alert parties under investigation to pending criminal indictments. 93 The Act
allowed the federal government to exercise more discretion in determining
which qui tam suits would go forward and, ultimately, which defendants
would be subject to prosecution. 94
89. Id. § 3730(d)(1). The amended language states:
Where the action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on disclosures of
specific information (other than information provided by the person bringing the ac-
tion) relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative
hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the court may award such
sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more than 10 percent of the proceeds,
taking into account the significance of the information and the role of the person
bringing the action in advancing the case to litigation. Any payment to a person
under the first or second sentence of this paragraph shall be made from the proceeds.
False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3156 (1986).
90. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). The amended language states that "[a]ny such person shall
also receive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily
incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be
awarded against the defendant." False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562,
§ 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3156 (1986).
91. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5288-89. Congress, while amending the Act
"to encourage more private enforcement suits ... recognize[d] the necessity for some coordi-
nation of disclosures in civil proceedings in order to protect the Government's interest in crim-
inal matters." Id.
92. United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1090
(C.D. Cal. 1989). The court commented:
The 1986 [Amendments] continue[d] the evolution of greater executive control over
qui tam lawsuits .... [T]he relator is given substantial authority to direct the initia-
tion, conduct and termination of litigation in the name of the United States. How-
ever, the government is accorded much more authority to restrain the relator, if it
choses to do so.... [T]he Act's [1986] provisions are carefully crafted to enable the
executive to enter the action and take control of the course of litigation.
Id.
93. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5279.
94. The amended language of the False Claims Act, setting out the language empowering
a private citizen to act as a qui tam relator, simultaneously grants the government a check on
this power.
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The 1986 Amendments required the qui tam relator to serve the United
States with his complaint and to file all material evidence in camera to re-
main under seal for sixty days.95 The sixty-day period allowed the govern-
ment to investigate the relator's claims but, more importantly, the filing
requirement prevented private party suits that infringed upon the govern-
ment's interests and injured the defendant's rights.9 6 Upon a showing of
good cause the court could extend the sixty-day period to allow the govern-
ment to decide whether to litigate on its own behalf.97 The government
could choose to intervene and prosecute the defendant or allow the relator to
proceed with the suit.98 Further 1986 Amendments permitted the govern-
ment to intervene in the suit at a later time.99 The Act also required that the
relator obtain court approval before serving the defendant with the com-
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and
for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the
Government. The action may be dismissed only ifthe court and the Attorney General
give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3154 (1986)
(emphasis added).
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). The amended language states:
A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence
and information the person possesses shall be served on the Government pursuant to
Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The complaint shall be filed in
camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the
defendant until the court so orders. The Government may elect to intervene and
proceed with the action within 60 days after it receives both the complaint and the
material evidence and information.
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3154-55
(1986).
96. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5289. The Senate Judiciary Committee be-
lieved that keeping the initial complaint under seal "protect[ed] both the Government and the
defendant's interests without harming those of the private relator." Id.
97. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3). The amended language states:
The Government may, for good cause shown, move the court for extensions of the
time during which the complaint remains under seal under paragraph (2). Any such
motions may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in camera. The defend-
ant shall not be required to respond to any complaint filed under this section until 20
days after the complaint is unsealed and served upon the defendant pursuant to Rule
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3155 (1986).
98. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4). The amended language states:
Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions obtained under para-
graph (3), the Government shall-
(A) proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be conducted by the
Government; or
(B) notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case the
person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action.
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3155 (1986).
99. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
plaint. " The filing procedure changes in the 1986 Amendments underscore
Congress's belief that the federal government should retain the primary au-
thority in prosecuting fraud under the False Claims Act, even when
presented with unknown evidence by a private qui tam relator.' 0 '
c. Status of the Qui Tam Relator
The most significant changes brought about by the 1986 Amendments re-
gard the qui tam relator.1 0 2 Prior to 1986, the False Claims Act limited the
role that the qui tam relator could play in any potential litigation and en-
larged the authority of the federal government to direct the action.'0 3 The
drafters of the 1986 Amendments, cognizant of the restrictions enacted by
the 1943 Amendments, broadly expanded the definition of the qui tam rela-
tor, lowering the jurisdictional requirements of the Act."° The contrasting
statutory revisions of the 1986 Amendments exhibit Congress's view of the
qui tam relator as both a powerful tool to combat fraud and a potential
hindrance in the federal government's effective prosecution of wrongdoers,
and reflect the attempt by Congress to balance the competing goals of the
1986 Amendments.
10 5
The legislative history of the Act states that the 1986 Amendments were
designed to increase the qui tam relator's role in directing the suit's develop-
ment. 0 6 This statement is tempered by the text of the Act, which subjects
100. Id § 3730(b)(2).
101. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5289. The Senate report stated that
"[k]eeping the qui tam complaint under seal for the initial 60-day time period is intended to
allow the Government an adequate opportunity to fully evaluate the private enforcement suit."
Id.
102. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)-(d).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
104. While one section of the False Claims Act states that "[a] person may bring a civil
action for a violation of [the Act] for the person and for the United States Government," 31
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), the section entitled "Certain actions barred" better defines the qualifica-
tions placed on the qui tam relator. The section prohibits suits against members of the armed
forces, legislative, judicial or executive branches under certain circumstances, and those suits
based on publicly disclosed information. Id. § 3730(e).
105. The Senate Report that accompanied the 1986 Amendments reflected the differing
views of the qui tam relator by Congress. While the Report acknowledges that Congress in-
tended to amend the False Claims Act "[in order to make the statute a more useful tool
against fraud in modern times," 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5266, the Report later
traces the historical difficulties arising from relator suits under the Act during the period of the
Marcus decision and the 1943 Amendments. Id. at 5276-77.
106. Id. at 5278-82. The Senate Report states that the 1986 Amendments are designed to
encourage the qui tam relator to take a more active role in the exposure and prosecution of
fraud. Id. One court remarked that "[o]ne theme recurring throughout the legislative history
... is the intent to encourage persons with first-hand knowledge of fraudulent misconduct to
report fraud." United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991).
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the qui tam relator to the priorities of the federal government to prosecute
false claims.,o 7 The 1986 Amendments give the government the authority to
control the direction of the suit.10 8 The government may dismiss or settle
the action over the objections of the relator.'0 9 In the event the government
pursues the relator's claims and intervenes, the 1986 Amendments grant the
federal government the primary responsibility for prosecuting the suit and
subordinate the role of the qui tam relator.110 The 1986 Amendments sad-
dle the persistent relator with court-imposed limitations on the ability to call
and examine witnesses in the action.11 1 In fact, the 1986 Amendments allow
the defendant in a qui tam suit to request that the court limit the relator's
participation when the relator too zealously pursues the claim.
12
The Act grants the qui tam relator power to proceed with the action if the
government declines to prosecute the defendant.1 13 However, the 1986
Amendments reserve to the government the choice to intervene at a later
date and take control of the action.1 14 The government may also petition
the court to stay discovery if it determines that the relator's actions would
interfere with the government's investigation or prosecution of similar
claims.1 15 Furthermore, the 1986 Amendments allow the government to
pursue any alternate remedies available for redressing false claims.
1 16
While the 1986 Amendments increased the federal government's discre-
tion to handle a qui tam relator's claims, they nevertheless eased the restric-
107. Congress intended to fulfill a number of goals by granting the federal government the
power of prosecutorial discretion in qui tam suits:
[These goals] were adopted primarily to allow the government first to ascertain in
private whether it was already investigating the claims stated in the suit and then to
consider whether it wished to intervene. The provisions were also designed to pre-
vent alleged wrongdoers from being tipped off that they were under investigation. As
secondary goals, Congress intended the new procedural requirements to rectify a
statutory anomaly "under which the defendant may be forced to answer the com-
plaint two days after being served, without knowing whether his opponent will be a
private litigant or the Federal government" and to protect the defendant's reputation
from unfounded public accusations.
United States ex rel. Erickson v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 912
(E.D. Va. 1989) (citations omitted) (quoting 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5289).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 91-100.
109. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (1988).
110. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
111. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
112. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(D). The statute states that, "[u]pon a showing by the defendant that
unrestricted participation during the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action
would be for purposes of harassment or would cause the defendant undue burden or unneces-
sary expense, the court may limit the participation of the person in the litigation." Id.
113. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 3730(c)(4).
116. Id. § 3730(c)(5).
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tions on the court's jurisdiction over a qui tam suit, thus expanding the
ability of a private party to prosecute false claims. 17 The 1943 Amend-
ments required courts to dismiss all actions in which the government pos-
sessed the information utilized by the relator at the time the suit was
brought."' This broad jurisdictional bar prevented many potential qui tam
relators from filing suit, resulting in a reduction of actions by qualified qui
tam relators." 9 By 1986, Congress was cognizant of the effect of the stat-
ute's jurisdictional bar on citizens who had valid knowledge of fraud, and
sought to remedy the problem.' 2 °
The 1986 Amendments removed the prior restrictions and broadened the
statutory language to enable those individuals with knowledge of the false
claims to bring a qui tam suit.' 2 ' The original Senate bill retained the bar on
parasitical suits based on information disclosed by the government in the
course of a separate action, by a congressional investigation, or in the news
media. 122 The bill did, however, allow a relator to base a suit on publicly-
disclosed information if the government had not taken action within six
months.' 23 The Senate subsequently amended the bill's language, splitting
117. Id. § 3730(e). The Senate report stated that Congress "believe[d] that the (1986
Amendments] which allow and encourage assistance from the private citizenry can make a
significant impact on bolstering the Government's fraud enforcement effort." 1986 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 5273.
118. False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608-09 (1943).
119. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding that a state government that was required to report fraud to the federal government
could not qualify as a relator under the Act); United States ex rel. Lapin v. International
Business Mach. Corp., 490 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D. Haw. 1980) (holding that the jurisdictional
bar applies even where a relator notifies the government of original allegations and the govern-
ment does not investigate or take action).
120. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5269. The Senate report stated that the 1986
Amendments "are aimed at correcting restrictive interpretations of the act's liability standard,
burden of proof, qui tam jurisdiction and other provisions in order to make the False Claims
Act a more effective weapon against Government fraud." Id.
121. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). The statute states:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the
public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative
hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought
by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information .... [O]riginal source" means an individual who has direct and in-
dependent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under
this section which is based on the information.
Id.
122. United States ex reL. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944
F.2d 1149, 1164 (3d Cir. 1991).
123. S. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2, at 4 (1985). The bill allowed the federal govern-
ment six months to review the relator's claims and decide whether or not to intervene. Id. § 2.
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the jurisdiction section to add an "original source" requirement.' 24 The
original source requirement barred suits based on information publicly dis-
closed through government sources or the media unless the party bringing
the suit had direct and independent knowledge of the information and had
informed the government of his knowledge. 125 Later changes to the bill's
"original source" language removed the exemption for information disclosed
through the news media.
126
The final bill adopted by Congress enlarged the pool of potential qui tam
relators while tightening government control over the prosecution of a false
claims action.127 The "original source" language added by the 1986 Amend-
ments undercut the prior ban on suits based on information possessed by the
government. 28 A successful relator could now capitalize on publicly-dis-
closed information if he met the "original source" criteria. a2 9  While the
statutory revisions gave the qui tam relator broader grounds on which to
base a suit under the Act,'3 0 the relator's power to retain full and independ-
ent control over the action remained subsidiary to the government.'
3'
124. 132 CONG. REC. 20531 (1986).
125. Id. Representative Berman, one of the sponsors of the Amendments, explained the
addition of the original source language:
A person is an original source if he had some of the information related to the claim
which he made available to the government or the news media in advance of the false
claims being publicly disclosed. This person has the right to bring an action after
these disclosures are made public as long as it is filed before an action is commenced
by the Government.
Id. at 29322.
126. Id. at 28567.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 91-116.
128. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988) (stating that a successful relator could now capi-
talize on publicly disclosed information if he met the "original source" criteria). One court
reflected on Congress's motivation in inserting the "original source" exception in the 1986
Amendments:
The original source language is clearly evocative of the failed 1943 Senate bill. This
bill would have permitted suits based on "sources original" to the relator, and was
described as allowing suits where the information was known to the government, but
had been obtained from the relator. In 1986, Congress saw the lack of an original
source exception as a major flaw in the 1943 Amendments. When the original source
exception was added late in the legislative process, I believe it was designed primarily
to protect people who publicly disclosed information themselves, just as the 1943 bill
would have protected people who provided information to the government. I do not
believe that it was inserted to bar recovery by "second-hand" sources only when
public disclosure has occurred.
United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d
1149, 1173-74 (3d Cir. 1991) (Scirica, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
129. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
130. See supra notes 101-16 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
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Congress clearly expressed that the 1986 Amendments were meant to en-
courage the cooperation of private parties in the prosecution of fraud.,
3 2
Statutory revisions created greater opportunities for qui tam relators to alert
the government to false claims, 133 but Congress failed to define adequately
jurisdictional boundaries of the Act. 134 The "original source" revision to the
statute, which served as the primary vehicle for an increase in private suits,
lacked a clear legislative statement as to the limits that Congress intended in
its incorporation."'" In the absence of a strong legislative foundation, only
the traditional bars against certain qui tam actions remained.' 36 The newly
revamped ability of the private relator to capitalize on knowledge of false
claims conflicted with the government's need to retain substantial authority
to prosecute fraud.'1 7  The balance Congress sought to strike between
increased opportunities for relators and paramount government control re-
sulted in disharmony, 38 generating confusion in their application, particu-
larly with the federal courts.
132. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5266-67. The 1986 Amendments were in-
tended "to encourage any individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that information
forward. In the face of sophisticated and widespread fraud, [Congress] believes only a coordi-
nated effort of both the Government and the citizenry will decrease this wave of defrauding
public funds." Id.
133. Id. at 5273. One commentator noted that "[the] United States recovered $225 million
in fiscal year (FY) 1989 under [the False Claims] Act compared to $27 million in FY 1985;
thirty-three qui tam actions were filed in FY 1987, ninety-three in FY 1989, and forty-five
during the first three months of calendar year 1990." James Dever, Double Jeopardy, False
Claims, and United States v. Halper, 20 PuB. CONT. L.J. 56, 58 n.8 (1990) (citations omitted).
134. See infra part II.
135. Courts reviewing qui tam suits have examined the "original source" language in-
cluded in the 1986 Amendments in applying the False Claims Act, and one court noted that
"[the legislative history does not conclusively establish the meaning of the words 'direct and
independent knowledge.' " United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1173 (3d Cir. 1991) (Scirica, J., dissenting).
136. See, e.g., id. at 1160 (barring suit based on "publicly disclosed" information learned
through "civil hearing"); United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13,
16 (2d Cir. 1990) (requiring that a qui tam relator must have "directly or indirectly" been a
source to the entity that disclosed information); United States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 730 F.
Supp. 1031 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding that a qui tam relator must be an "original source" to the
information on which the suit is based).
137. One court observed that "[tlhe 1986 amendments attempt to strike a balance between
encouraging private citizens to expose fraud and avoiding parasitic actions by opportunists
who attempt to capitalize on public information without seriously contributing to the disclo-
sure of the fraud." United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir.
1992). Another court, reflecting on past difficulties with qui tam suits, stated that "the princi-
pal intent ... was to have the qui tam suit provision operate somewhere between the almost
unrestrained permissiveness represented by the Marcus decision, and the restrictiveness of the
post-1943 cases, which precluded suit even by original sources." Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1154
(citations omitted).
138. See infra part II.
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 1986: CITIZEN AS RELATOR OR A
RETURN TO MARCUS?
The statutory revisions of the 1986 Amendments have created unintended
results as qui tam relators not envisioned by Congress have brought success-
ful suits under the False Claims Act. 39 The revised jurisdictional language
in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), which grants a qui tam relator standing under the
Act, has been the focal point of judicial inquiry. Whereas the False Claims
Act previously set strict limits on qui tam relators, the 1986 Amendments
broadened the jurisdictional bar to encourage private citizens to expose false
claims."4 The 1986 Amendments changed the statutory language of three
key elements of § 3730(e)(4): "public disclosure," 141 the categories of "pub-
lic disclosure,"' 142 and "original source."' 43 Courts reviewing qui tam ac-
tions have differed in their interpretations of these elements, and the result
has been an uneven application of the Act.
A. Public Disclosure
Section 3730(e)(4)(A) bars a qui tam relator from bringing an action
"based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions" outlined in
specific sources. 44 The section's language reflects congressional intent that
parasitic suits should remain forbidden.' 45 Courts construing this language,
however, have differed on the definition of "public disclosure."' 46 Some
courts have focused on the congressional reaction to the Supreme Court's
affirmation of parasitic suits in Marcus, and therefore give the language
139. In the case of federal government employees serving as qui tam relators, the House
report on the 1992 amendments to the False Claims Act reflects Congress's lack of foresight:
The issue of whether federal government employees could sue under the qui tam
provisions of the False Claims Act was not explicitly addressed in the 1986 amend-
ments. According to the sponsors of those amendments, the problem of government
investigators and auditors using information they learned in the course of their duties
as the basis of lawsuits in their own name, rather than allowing their employer to
investigate and prosecute the case, was simply not contemplated.
H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 5 (emphasis added).
140. The House Report remarked that "[i]n 1986, in order to modernize and enhance the
False Claims Act as the government's primary litigation tool to combat fraud, the Act was a
[sic] substantially revised, including significant changes to the jurisdictional provisions that
barred 'honest informers.' " Id. at 4.
141. See discussion infra part II.A.
142. See discussion infra part lI.B.
143. See discussion infra part II.C.
144. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988).
145. Hanifin, supra note 5, at 570. "It is evident from reading § 3730(e)(4) that Congress
intended to bar parasitic qui tam suits, that is, suits based on public information." United
States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
146. See infra text accompanying notes 151-69.
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broad sweep.' 47 In contrast, other courts have noted the section's lack of
legislative history and narrowly define the statutory language.148 The end
result has been a partial renewal of judicial support for suits that Congress
expressly sought to outlaw in 1943.
While Congress intended to give private parties a greater opportunity to
bring suit under the 1986 Amendments, it clearly did not mean to retreat
from the historical ban on qui tam actions based on information known to
the federal government or disclosed through the media. 149 The "public dis-
closure" language was aimed at achieving a balance between these con-
cerns.15 The lack of a clear statement of legislative intent, however, has
caused many courts to focus on the historical restrictions of the Act and give
a broad reading to the statute.1 51
In United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential
Insurance Co. ,52 the relator, an attorney, brought a qui tam suit based on
information disclosed during the course of discovery in a separate legal pro-
147. See, e.g., United States ex rel Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 323 (2d Cir.
1992) (arguing that Congress intended an expansive reading of the "public disclosure" lan-
guage as it did not prescribe narrow restrictions); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin
& Bustamante v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1159-60 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
information learned during discovery constituted a "public disclosure"); United States ex rel.
Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that a qui tam suit is
barred under the False Claims Act if based on information "in the public domain"); United
States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 90-41 IN,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *6 (E.D. La. May 28, 1992) (holding that "because there is a
presumption of public access to discovered materials . . . document production constitutes
'public disclosure' within the meaning of the [False Claims Act]").
148. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that information disclosed during discovery is not barred from use in a lawsuit
under the "public disclosure" language); United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931
F.2d 1493, 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (stating that the False Claims Act bars a qui tam suit based
on "publicly disclosed" information "only in certain enumerated instances"); United States ex
rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1040,
1050 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (stating that the "plain meaning" of the statutory language limits the
application of the "public disclosure" bar).
149. Hanifin, supra note 5, at 580-81. "[T]o avoid the blatant opportunism embodied in
cases like Marcus, Congress enacted narrowly circumscribed exceptions to qui tam jurisdic-
tion." Doe, 960 F.2d at 322.
150. One court noted the progression of the False Claims Act from a source of "unre-
strained profiteering to a flaccid enforcement tool .... The 1986 amendments attempt to strike
a balance between encouraging private citizens to expose fraud and avoiding parasitic actions
by opportunists who attempt to capitalize on public information without seriously contributing
to the disclosure of the fraud." Doe, 960 F.2d at 321.
151. The Doe court prefaced its review of the application of the False Claims Act with a
discussion of the history of the Act, including the statement that "[c]learly, the purpose of the
[1986] amendment[s] was to retain the 1943 Amendment's bias against parasitic lawsuits." Id.
(citing Richard J. Oparil, The Coming Impact of the Amended False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L.
REV. 525, 549 (1989)).
152. 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991).
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ceeding.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit es-
chewed a search of the 1986 Amendment's legislative history and looked
instead to the principal intent of the Act-the bar on parasitic suits."54 The
court concentrated on the level of public accessibility to civil litigation docu-
ments in the absence of a protective order, and concluded that the disclosure
of documents through discovery constituted a "public disclosure" under the
Act.155 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United
States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp. 156 adopted the reasoning in Prudential
for application to "innocent" corporate employees exposed to allegations of
fraud.'5 7 The court rejected the relator's contention that, because members
of the public could not force the employees to divulge the information, there
was no "public disclosure."'
158
153. Id. at 1151-52. Stinson, the relator, served as attorney for an individual injured in an
automobile accident in a challenge against Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. regarding
Provident's failure to pay beneficiary claims, instead allowing Medicare to act as primary in-
surer. Id. at 1151. In the course of the Provident suit, Stinson obtained internal Provident
documents suggesting that Provident and other insurance companies failed to act as primary
insurers for the working aged as required under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982). Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1151. Subsequently,
Stinson brought qui tam actions against Provident and the other insurance companies under
the False Claims Act. Id.; accord United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante
v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 90-41 IN, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990 (E.D. La. May 28, 1992);
United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, Inc., 755
F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v.
Pilot Life Ins. Co., C-90-29-G (M.D.N.C. 1990); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin
& Bustamante v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
154. Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1154.
155. Id. at 1159-60.
156. 960 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1992). The relator, an attorney representing an indicted em-
ployee of defendant John Doe Corporation, filed the qui tam action when he learned that the
federal government had not instituted a civil suit under the False Claims Act. Id. at 320. The
Federal Government moved to have the suit dismissed, and the district court granted the
Government's motion based on the grounds that despite the language of § 3730(e)(4)(A), the
False Claims Act barred suits based on information possessed by the government when the suit
was filed, and because the action was based upon information that had already been publicly
disclosed. Id. at 320-21.
157. Id. at 322. The court drew a contrast between Doe and the type of public disclosure in
Prudential where "any diligent member of the public could have gone to court and demanded
to see the documents." Id. In Doe, "the allegations of fraud were not just potentially accessi-
ble to strangers, they were actually divulged to strangers of the fraud, namely the innocent
employees of John Doe Corp." Id. Once informed of the fraud allegations, the employees
were under no obligation to keep silent. The court stated: "We cannot accept the relator's
argument that simply because other members of the public did not have a legal right to pry the
allegations of fraud from the mouths of these innocent employees, there was no 'public disclo-
sure.' " Id. at 323.
158. Id. The court stated that "[w]ere this Congress' [sic] intent, we would expect a nar-
rower exception to jurisdiction, one that bars only those actions based on generally accessible
government documents and news media accounts. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) is not so circum-
scribed." Id.
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Other courts have looked beyond the broad restrictions of the False
Claims Act and centered their inquiries on the motivating factor of the 1986
Amendments. While the legislative history suggests that Congress primarily
sought to construct a jurisdictional barrier through the "public disclosure"
language, '59 it directed more attention to creating an exception in the "origi-
nal source" language, which would expand the pool of eligible qui tam rela-
tors. 16 Courts have seized upon this expansive intent of Congress to narrow
the application of the "public disclosure" language.' 61 The district court in
United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Georgia,162 faced with circumstances identical to those in Pruden-
tial,163 restricted its reading of "public disclosure" to the qualifying lan-
guage of the statute and allowed the qui tam relator to use material disclosed
in discovery.
164
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States
ex rel. Wang v. FMC Corp. 165 similarly found no support under the "public
disclosure" language for restricting information disclosed during discovery
in the same suit. 166 The panel reasoned that the limitation would operate to
159. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5295. "Subsection (e)(4) prohibits qui tam
suits based on information not in the possession of the Government." Id.
160. The 1986 Amendments sought to "allow and encourage assistance from the private
citizenry [to] make a significant impact on bolstering the Government's fraud enforcement
effort." Id. at 5273 (emphasis added).
161. See cases cited supra note 148. One court remarked that through the 1986 Amend-
ments "Congress permitted one who publicly disclosed the information to bring a qui tam suit.
There is nothing to suggest that Congress meant to do anything more than that, and some
evidence that it meant to do less." United States ex rel. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412,
1419 (9th Cir. 1992).
162. 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
163. The memoranda obtained by the relator indicated that defendant Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Georgia engaged in the same fraudulent Medicare practices as those alleged in the
Prudential case. Id. at 1044.
164. Id. at 1050. Blue Cross Blue Shield, citing the Prudential decision, argued that the
term "hearing" was synonymous with "proceeding," thereby broadening the scope of
§ 3730(e)(4). Id. The court disagreed, stating that "[r]ead against the 'object and policy' of
the 1986 Amendments, however, it is clear that such a strained reading of 'hearing' contra-
venes that policy-to encourage people with direct knowledge of fraud perpetuated against the
government to blow the whistle." Id. at 1049.
165. 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
166. Id. at 1416-17. Wang, a former employee of FMC Corporation, accused FMC of
defrauding the federal government on four separate military contracts. Id. at 1415. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that allegations based on two of the
projects did not qualify for review under § 3730(e)(4)(A) as the allegations had not been pub-
licly disclosed. Id. at 1415-16. Wang learned of the allegations regarding the third project by
"troll[ing] the massive number of documents made available to him during the discovery phase
of his qui tam suit," leading the court to hold that "[e]vidence publicly disclosed during the
discovery phase of a qui tam suit is not barred from use in that same suit by section
3730(e)(4)(A)." Id. at 1416. On the allegations regarding the fourth project, based upon alle-
gations and information that had been publicly disclosed, the court ruled that § 3730(e)(4)(A)
[Vol. 42:935
False Claims Amendments Act Of 1986
discourage a relator from using discovery materials as a source of potential
evidence of fraud.' 6 7 In United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp. ,168 the
court relied upon Congress's intent to encourage private individuals to come
forward with information on false claims in refusing to give an expansive
reading to the statutory language.
169
B. Categories of Public Disclosure
Section 3730(e)(4)(A) strictly defines the types of public disclosures that
trigger the jurisdictional bar under the Act as those "in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government
Accounting Office report, hearing, audit or investigation, or from the news
media."' 170 Despite the explicit language of the statute, courts have debated
over the level of inclusiveness to be read into the language.171 In an attempt
to expand the restrictions of the statute, some courts have interpreted the
language to include judicial proceedings not otherwise listed. 172 Conversely,
barred Wang's suit as "[only] those who 'directly or indirectly' disclose an allegation might
qualify as its original source." Id. at 1419.
167. Id. at 1416-17. A bar on publicly disclosed material would cause "qui tam plaintiffs
[to] have little choice but to waive their right to discovery for fear of disclosing information
that would bar the claims for which they might wish discovery in the first place." Id. at 1416.
168. 931 F.2d 1493 (1 1th Cir. 1991). Williams worked as an attorney for the United States
Air Force when he learned of alleged bidrigging by NEC Corporation on telecommunications
contracts. Id. at 1494. Williams alerted his superiors to the fraud allegations and subse-
quently brought his qui tam action. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit disagreed with Government arguments that the qui tam relator must wait to file suit
until the government has an opportunity to commence its own action, stating that "nothing in
the False Claims Act mandates such deference." Id. at 1496 n.7.
169. Id. at 1499-1500. The Government also argued that because Williams was a govern-
ment employee, his qui tam action violated the public disclosure language based on his "dual
status" as government employee and private citizen. Id. at 1500 n. 11. The court rejected this
argument, stating that "[w]e simply cannot fathom the scenario suggested by the United
States, wherein Williams-as-government-employee disclosed the information to Williams-as-
private-citizen." Id.; see also United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20
(1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the "public disclosure" language does not impose additional re-
strictions on government employees bringing qui tam actions), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1312
(1991); United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating
that a suit brought by a former government employee was not intended to be barred by "public
disclosure" language).
170. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988).
171. See infra notes 172-91 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 323 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding that information disclosed during a criminal investigation was barred by the
statutory language); United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 813 F. Supp. 410,
413 (D. Md. 1993) (stating that "the term 'civil hearing' is broad enough to include complaints
filed in a civil case, even if the matter does not come to full trial or otherwise involve a judicial
hearing"); United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1090
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (stating that the public disclosure bar operates where the government "has
publicly disclosed the findings of an investigation"). One court has argued that " 'civil hear-
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other courts that have refused to broaden the meaning of "public disclosure"
have strictly adhered to the statutory language when examining the in-
stances of public disclosure.
173
Two early cases indirectly established the underlying basis upon which
later court decisions construed the statutory language to encompass other
unnamed proceedings. In United States ex rel. La Valley v. First National
Bank of Boston 174 the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts assumed that a civil "proceeding" meant the same as "hearing"
under the Act in ruling that a public disclosure had occurred.175 The court
cited a statement in United States ex rel. Houck v. Folding Carton Adminis-
tration Committee 171 that treated the enumerated instances of public disclo-
sure only as examples, and included civil hearings among those situations in
ing' has been read to 'encompass the full range of proceedings in a civil lawsuit.' " United
States ex rel. Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences, No. 90-2568, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14063, at *12 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1992) (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry.
v. Quinn, No. 91-2081, slip op. at 7 (D.D.C. July 14, 1992)).
173. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d
1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that equating a relator's contract work with an "adminis-
trative investigation" would "require[] a major extension of the term"); United States ex rel.
Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11 th Cir. 1991) (refusing to expand the scope of
the statute beyond the statutory language); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin &
Bustamante v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1256-57 (S.D. Fla.
1989) (stating that civil litigation is probably not defined as a "hearing" under section
3730(e)(4)(A)).
174. 707 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Mass. 1988). LaValley, the relator, brought an action against
First National Bank alleging that the bank had fraudulently induced the Farmer's Home Ad-
ministration (FmHA) to accept a guaranteed loan of $24.7 million. Id. LaValley was an
investment banker seeking financial support for the project and claimed that the bank
presented the FmHA false documents misrepresenting the bank's true belief that the loan
would not be repaid. Id. at 1352-53.
175. Id. at 1366. LaValley argued for a narrow reading of "public disclosure" and cited
the False Claims Act's legislative history. Id. He claimed that the legislative history suggested
that "proceeding" was specifically dropped from the language of the 1986 Amendments, evi-
dencing the intent of Congress that "public disclosure" be limited to those examples cited. Id.
The court did not comment on LaValley's claims, ruling simply that a public disclosure had
occurred. Id.
176. 1988 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,176 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Houck concerns the disbursement
of funds from a settlement fund arising from civil antitrust litigation. When excess funds were
available after outstanding claims were paid, various methods of disposal for the remaining
monies were debated. The reviewing court approved a plan to distribute one-half on a pro rata
basis to original claimants and one-half to two or more Chicago-area law schools for research
on antitrust litigation. Houck, who assisted claimants in filing and receiving claims from the
fund, filed the qui tam suit alleging that the Folding Carton Administration Committee and its
members as well as those who received money knowingly disbursed and received funds in
violation of the original court order. United States ex rel. Houck v. Folding Carton Admin.
Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 495-99, 503 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1025 (1990).
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which public disclosure of materials could occur.17 7 Using La Valley and
Houck as touchstones, more recent decisions have gone beyond these cases
to extend the statute's jurisdictional bar.' 7  Relying upon the congressional
reaction to the Supreme Court's ruling in Marcus, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Ger-
lin & Bustamante v. Prudential Insurance Co. 179 found that the statutory
language covered all instances of proceedings, including civil hearings.'80
The broad jurisdictional bar, which was created to prevent parasitic suits,"'
has been harnessed by courts to override the competing intent of Congress
that the False Claims Act encourage qui tam suits by private parties.1
s2
Other courts have been hesitant to forbid qui tam suits that arise from
circumstances other than those enumerated in § 3730(e)(4)(A). 18 3 These
courts reason that Congress did not intend an expansive reading of the stat-
ute and that the plain meaning of the language limits the jurisdictional
bar.i4 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Geor-
177. Houck, 1988 Trade Cas. at 59,172. "[TIn its present form, the Act does not permit qui
tam plaintiffs to bring actions based solely on open transactions publicly disclosed in, among
other forums, civil proceedings and hearings." Id.
178. See cases cited supra note 172.
179. 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991).
180. Id at 1155. "Only if the criminal 'hearing' to which subsection (e)(4)(A) refers is
broad enough to cover the full range of proceedings in the course of civil, criminal, or adminis-
trative litigation would the type of lawsuit represented by Marcus and deemed parasitic by
Congress be banned." Id.
181. "One of the principal goals of barring qui tam actions based on public disclosures is to
prevent the 'parasitical' or 'copy cat' lawsuit." Kenneth D. Brody, Recent Developments in the
Area of "Qui Tam" Lawsuits, FED. BAR NEWS & J., Dec. 1990, at 592, 595.
182. In Prudential, the relator argued that the legislative history of the 1986 Amendments
indicated that Congress intended the "public disclosure" language to be narrowly applied be-
cause the term "hearing" replaced "proceeding," which had appeared in an earlier draft of the
legislation. Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1156. The court disagreed, stating that "the legislative
history does not reveal what Congress intended by the substitution, and the substitution of
'hearing' for 'proceeding' was part of a revision which expanded the jurisdictional bar by delet-
ing the requirement that the disclosure be made by the government." Id.
183. See cases cited supra note 172.
184. One court prefaced its holding on the "public disclosure" language with an analysis of
the legislative history of the 1986 Amendments:
Section 3730's jurisdictional edicts were part of the 1986 Amendments to the [False
Claims Act]. The clear statutory policy behind the 1986 Amendments was "not only
to provide the Government's law enforcers with mere [sic] effective tools, but to en-
courage any individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that information
forward."
United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, Inc., 755
F. Supp. 1040, 1048 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (quoting 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5266-
67). The court then stated that "Congress's use of the word 'hearing' is telling. 'Where Con-
gress uses terms that have a settled meaning under ... common law, a court must infer, unless
the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress meant to incorporate the established meaning of
these terms.'" Id. at 1048-49 (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
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gia in United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Georgia 185 declined to equate "hearing" with "proceeding"
under the statute, and allowed the use of information disclosed during civil
discovery.' 86 The court based its conclusion on the fact that Congress could
have included the term "proceeding" in the statutory language, or could
have employed qualifying terms such as "for example" or "for instance."18 7
Other courts have stated indirectly that "public disclosure" is defined by and
limited to the statutory examples. 8s In considering the ability of a govern-
ment employee to file suit under the Act, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit in United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co. 189 held
that the False Claims Act does not bar the court's jurisdiction over disclo-
sures other that those explicitly stated.' 90 Rather than dissect the wording
of the statute to broaden its range, the court kept a focus on the statutory
185. 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
186. Id. at 1049-50. Blue Cross Blue Shield urged the district court to find that the infor-
mation learned by Stinson during the course of its litigation with Prudential should be barred
under the "public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative
hearing" language of the statute. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988); see Blue Cross Blue Shield,
755 F. Supp. at 1050. After reviewing both the False Claim Act's legislative history and the
plain meaning of the statutory language, the court held that "[a] literal reading of the com-
monly used term 'hearing' is not 'demonstrably at odds' with Congress' [sic] overarching con-
cern to curb government fraud tempered with a desire not to create windfalls for opportunistic
litigants." Id.
187. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 755 F. Supp. at 1050. The court remarked that "Congress
easily could have said 'proceeding' if it meant 'proceeding.' " Id.
188. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d
1416, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1991); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1256-57 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
189. 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1312 (1991). LeBlanc observed
violations of government contracts by Raytheon while working as an employee of the federal
government's Defense Contract Administrative Service. United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Ray-
theon Co., 729 F. Supp. 170, 171 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1312 (1991). The district court denied LeBlanc's qui tam action because LeBlanc
learned of the fraud during his government employment. Id. at 175. "Because government
employees maintain a dual status-arms of the government while at work, private citizens
while not at work-a 'public disclosure' necessarily occurs whenever a government employee
uses government information he learned on the job to file a qui tam lawsuit in his private
capacity." Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit overruled the district
court's holding on public disclosure, putting forward three arguments. LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at
20. First, the language of § 3730(e)(4) bars both private citizens and government employees
from using publicly disclosed information, but does not prevent either person from using non-
disclosed information. Id. Second, the appeals court rejected the "schizophrenic" characteri-
zation of government employees, and emphasized the limiting language of § 3730(e)(4) over
public disclosures. Id. Third, the filing of a qui tam suit is not a public disclosure in itself, as
the False Claims Act requires that the action be filed under seal. Id.
190, LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 20.
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language in its entirety, effectively balancing the competing goals of the 1986
Amendments.19
C. Original Source
The jurisdictional bar under § 3730(e)(4)(A) incorporates an exception
that allows a qui tam plaintiff who qualifies as an "original source" to file
suit.'92 The potential relator must meet two criteria to be an "original
source." First, the individual must have direct and independent knowledge
of the information on which the allegations are based.' 9 3 Second, the indi-
vidual must have voluntarily provided the information to the government
prior to initiating the qui tam suit. 194 The "original source" provision fur-
ther evidences the dual intent of Congress to encourage private parties with
information of fraud against the government to bring an action as a qui tam
plaintiff.'95 As in the case of the "public disclosure" language, courts have
given varying interpretations to the provision.' 96 The difference in the judi-
cial views stems from how each court perceives the 1986 Amendments as a
retreat from the strong jurisdictional bars of the 1943 Amendments.
1. Direct and Independent Knowledge
The condition that the relator have direct and independent knowledge of
the information reflects the congressional intent to bar "copycat" relators
from using the False Claims Act to reap an unjust reward. 9 The majority
of courts that have considered the "original source" requirement have ad-
hered to a formalistic reading of the statute.' 98 The relator must obtain "di-
191. Id. After listing the types of public disclosure under the False Claims Act, the court
stated that the Act "does not deny jurisdiction over those actions based on disclosures other
than those specified." Id.
192. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988).
193. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
194. Id.
195. United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 729 F. Supp. 170, 176 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 1312 (1991); United States ex rel.
Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp.
1247, 1250 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
196. See infra notes 197-227.
197. One of the authors of the 1986 Amendments stated, "This amendment seeks to assure
that a qui tam action based solely on public disclosures cannot be brought by an individual
with no direct and independent knowledge of the information or who had not been the original
source to the entity that disclosed the allegations." 132 CONG. REC. 20536 (1986).
198. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp.,
985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d Cir.) (stating that the relator "must satisfy the limited exception" of
the "original source" requirement), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2962 (1993); United States ex rel.
Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., 971 F.2d 548, 553 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the require-
ments of the "original source" language "are plain, unambiguous and require no further scru-
tiny"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993); United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson &
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rect" knowledge of the fraud without the benefit of an intermediary who
introduces the information to the relator. 1'99 Similarly, courts characterize a
relator's knowledge as "independent" when the information is not acquired
through public disclosure or, in some instances, through the government.2
One court has ruled that information garnered through civil discovery failed
the statute's knowledge prong because the relator obtained the documents
through public disclosure and with the assistance of an intermediary. 20' An-
other court held that the statute barred a qui tam suit brought by a govern-
ment employee because the employee's knowledge was not independent.
20 2
The court reasoned that as an employee of the government, the plaintiff had
a duty to expose fraud, and therefore any rewards arising from such discov-
eries belonged to the government.
203
Other courts have construed the "direct and independent knowledge" re-
quirement to permit suits where the relator's knowledge is dependent on
another party. 2° In United States ex rel Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Busta-
mante v. Provident Life & Accident Co. ,205 the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida upheld an action by a relator who devel-
oped a qui tam claim primarily through information obtained in civil discov-
ery in an unrelated action.20 6 The plaintiff in Provident Life had taken
discovery information of the fraud and combined it with his own research.20 7
The court interpreted prior decisions to allow a qui tam suit as long as the
Co., 813 F. Supp. 410, 412-13 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that the "[original source] bar is an
attempt to forestall opportunistic qui tam actions based on publicly available information");
United States ex rel. Erickson v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 914-
15 (E.D. Va. 1989) (analyzing a relator's status as an "original source" by outlining the exclu-
sionary language of the statute).
199. United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944
F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991). The Prudential court held that the relator was not an "origi-
nal source" because the relator's knowledge of the fraud came through "the unknown Provi-
dent employee responsible for the telephone call and notation and the discovery procedure by
which the memoranda were produced." Id.
200. Hanifin, supra note 5, at 594. See United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913
F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1312 (1991); United States ex rel. Houck v.
Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 505 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026
(1990).
201. Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1160-61.
202. LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 20.
203. Id. "It was LeBlanc's responsibility, a condition of his employment, to uncover fraud.
The fruits of his effort belong to his employer-the government." Id.
204. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
205. 721 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
206. Id. at 1258.
207. Id. at 1257. The qui tam plaintiff corresponded with an employee of the Health Care
Financing Administration, the entity responsible for administering the Medicare program, and
conducted research of complaints filed with the Indiana Insurance Department. Id. The
court held that "[tihe information obtained by the Stinson firm can be characterized as 'direct.'
Stinson does not seem to be a disinterested outsider and did not 'simply stumble across and
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relator had not based the action solely on publicly disclosed information.20 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States
ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp. ,209 while declining to discuss the "original
source" exception,21 refused to ban actions by government employees who
based their suits on information obtained during their government
employment.211
2. Voluntary Disclosure
The statute's requirement that the relator "voluntarily" provide the gov-
ernment with the information upon which the suit is based, although not
explicitly stated in the legislative history, can be partially attributed to the
1943 Amendment's bar against relators who were legally required to disclose
their information.212 While the 1986 Amendments sought to encourage in-
dividuals to expose fraud, the "original source" language, and specifically
the "voluntary disclosure" requirement, reflects this traditional jurisdic-
tional bar.21 3 The "voluntary" provision prevents parasitical relators from
interesting court file.'.. . The Stinson information can also be characterized as flowing from a
source 'independent' of the [original] litigation ...." Id. at 1258 (citations omitted).
208. Id. at 1257 (citing United States ex rel. Houck v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 881
F.2d 494, 504 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990)). Expanding upon the notion
of information that is barred under the False Claims Act, the court stated that "[p]ublication
of general, non-specific information does not necessarily lead to the discovery of specific indi-
vidual fraud which is the target of the qui tam suit." Id. at 1258.
209. 931 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
210. Id. at 1501 n. 14. The court's reluctance stemmed from the Government assertion that
"a government employee who brings an action based upon information he learns within the
scope of his government duties can never qualify as an "original source.' " Id. The court
stated that the Government argument was "simply incompatible" with the court's holdings.
Id. The court also cited the First Circuit's stance on a government employee as an "original
source" in United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1312 (1991). After the LeBlanc court found that no public disclosure had
occurred in the employee's suit, the court considered the relator's status as an "original
source." Id. The Williams court viewed the court's action in LeBlanc as "one step too far,
Once it found no 'public disclosure,' its inquiry should have ended and jurisdiction should
have been acknowledged." Williams, 931 F.2d at 1501 n.13.
211. Williams, 931 F.2d at 1501 n.14. "Such an assertion is simply incompatible with our
holding that government employees are not barred from bringing qui tam actions based upon
information acquired in the course of their government employment." Id.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64, 73-74.
213. United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 729 F. Supp. 170, 176 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1312 (1991). "The 'original source
doctrine' was designed to bridge Congress' [sic] competing goals of preventing opportunistic
lawsuits while at the same time encouraging the disclosure of information otherwise unavaila-
ble to the government." Id. (emphasis added).
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utilizing publicly disclosed information as an "original source" and ensures
that the government is aware of claims of fraud.2 14
Problems have arisen regarding the application of the "voluntary disclo-
sure" provision to government employees. Prior to the 1986 Amendments,
courts prohibited suits by government employees based on the statutory re-
quirement that the information must not be in the possession of the govern-
ment at the commencement of the suit. 2 15 The bar covered even those
employees who would otherwise qualify as an "original source. ' 21 6 Neither
the 1986 Amendments themselves nor their legislative history address the
standing of government employees to sue under the Act, and courts have
generally viewed this silence as an endorsement of qui tam suits by govern-
ment employees.2 17  One court has stated that only those government
214. Senator Grassley, one of the authors of the 1986 Amendments, described the "volun-
tarily" requirement of the "original source" language:
In the definition of "original source," the requirement that the individual "volunta-
rily" informed the Government... is meant to preclude the ability of an individual
to sue under the qui tam section of the False Claims Act when his suit is based solely
on public information and the individual was a source of the allegations only because
the individual was subpoenaed to come forward. However, those persons who have
been contacted or questioned by the Government ... and cooperated by providing
information which later led to a public disclosure would be considered to have "vol-
untarily" informed the Government . . . and therefore considered eligible qui tam
relators.
132 CONG. REC. 20536 (1986).
215. See United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1103 (7th Cir. 1984).
The court in Dean noted that "the jurisdictional bar of [the statute] applies whenever the
government has knowledge of the 'essential information upon which the suit is predicated.' "
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Florida, 615 F.2d 1370, 1371 (5th Cir. 1980));
see also Safir v. Blackwell, 579 F.2d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that "knowledge by the
Government prior to suit bars the action, even if the plaintiff is the source of the knowledge"),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979); United States ex rel. Pettis v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577
F.2d 668, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1978) (asserting that the statutory bar of the False Claims Act
"affords no crevice of ambiguity within which to nestle the exception" for a government rela-
tor with knowledge of fraud); United States v. Pittman, 151 F.2d 851, 852 (5th Cir. 1945)
(holding that the statutory language of the False Claims Act provides a strict bar to a govern-
ment relator when the government possesses the information), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 843
(1946); United States ex rel. Vance v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1038, 1042
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (holding that "suits by informers are barred where the essential information
upon which they are based is already in the hands of the government regardless of the govern-
ment's source of the information").
216. Dean, 729 F.2d at 1103. The Dean court added that if the government possesses the
relevant information, the bar would apply "even when the plaintiff is the source of that knowl-
edge." Id.
217. H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 4. The 1943 Amendments to the False Claims
Act imposed a bar on "parasitic" suits based on information in the possession of the govern-
ment, and the bar functioned to restrict suits by government employees. Id. The 1986
Amendments "repealed the language that courts had held barred suits by government employ-
ees, but the new provisions contained no definitive statement regarding employee suits." Id.
Courts have interpreted the relaxation of the jurisdictional bar to mean that "there is no blan-
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employees charged with exposing fraud would be barred by the statute, but




In addition to the requirements of direct and independent knowledge and
voluntary disclosure, one court has posited that a third requirement exists in
the "original source" provision. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co. 219
examined the language in sections 3730(e)(4)(A) and (B) and interpreted the
use of "information." '22 "Information" in paragraph (A), stated the court,
referred to information that had been publicly disclosed, while "informa-
tion" in paragraph (B), modified by "on which the allegations are based,"
referred to the information that served as the basis of the suit.221 The more
expansive definition of "information" in paragraph (B), combined with legis-
lative statements on the "original source" language, led the court to believe
that in addition to the stated requirements of direct and independent knowl-
edge and voluntary disclosure, a qui tam plaintiff "must have directly or
indirectly been a source to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegation on
which a suit is based.",222 The court reasoned that the additional disclosure
requirement supported Congress's aim of encouraging qui tam suits by co-
ercing a potential relator to initiate the action before another party disclosed
the information.223
The court's requirement that a relator must have actively participated in
the public disclosure undermines the "original source" exception and the
ket exclusion of government employees as potential qui tam relators." United States ex rel.
Erickson v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 912 (E.D. Va. 1989); see
also United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that "neither case law nor legislative history" support the bar on qui tam
suits by government employees); United States ex rel. McDowell v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (stating that "under certain circumstances a
government employee's qui tam action, based on information obtained during the course of her
employment, may... fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court"); United States v.
CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that "Congress could
have chosen to specifically exclude present and/or former government employees from bring-
ing a qui tam action, but Congress did not").
218. United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1501 n.14 (11th Cir.
1991).
219. 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990).
220. Id. at 16.
221. Id. at 16-17.
222. Id. at 16.
223. Id. at 18. The court concluded that the extra requirement "discourages persons with
relevant information from remaining silent and encourages them to report such information at
the earliest possible time." Id.
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intent of Congress to expand the base of qualified relators.2 24 Those individ-
uals who have extensive knowledge of fraud will be excluded as a qui tam
relator if some small portion of their information is made available to the
public by another individual. 22 5 This new disclosure rule also contradicts
those court decisions that allow an individual who obtains his information
through civil discovery to bring a qui tam suit. 2 2 6 In such instances the
relator has no hand in disclosing the information, either directly or indi-
rectly. The disclosure requirement formulated by the Second Circuit in Dick
serves to discourage individuals from researching possible evidence of fraud
and retreats to the broad jurisdictional bar that the 1986 Amendments
sought to alleviate.
227
The judicial interpretation of the jurisdictional language in § 3730(e)(4)
has resulted in an emphasis on Congress's desire to restrict abuses of qui tam
suits at the expense of qualified qui tam relators. Congress intended the
revised statutory language to create opportunities previously denied to pri-
vate citizens with knowledge of fraud.228 While Congress did not contem-
plate a retreat from the historical prohibition against parasitic suits in the
224. A 1992 House of Representatives report that accompanied proposed amendments to
the False Claims Act pointed to the Dick court's imposition of additional standards on qui tam
relators as a source of "ambiguity" that was contrary to the original intent of Congress in the
1986 Amendments. H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 14. "The [proposed legislation]
clarifies that an original source is not required to be a direct or independent source to the entity
that discloses the allegations." Id.
225. Some courts have taken a strong position on the disclosure of a relator's information:
[Afll those who "directly or indirectly" disclose an allegation might qualify as its
original source. Anyone who helped to report the allegation to either the govern-
ment or the media would have "indirectly" helped to publicly disclose it. If, how-
ever, someone republishes an allegation that already been publicly disclosed, he
cannot bring a qui tam suit, even if he had "direct and independent knowledge" of
the fraud. He is no "whistleblower." A "whistleblower" sounds the alarm; he does
not echo it. The Act rewards those brave enough to speak in the face of a "conspir-
acy of silence," and not their mimics.
United States ex rel. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1419 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted); see also United States ex rel. Fine v. University of California, 821 F. Supp. 1356,
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that to qualify as an "original source," the qui tam relator
"must demonstrate that his was one of the voices that led to the disclosure of the alleged
fraud").
226. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1040, 1050 (S.D. Ga. 1990); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons,
Gerlin & Bustamante v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1258 (S.D.
Fla. 1989).
227. See False Claims Amendments Act of 1992." Hearings on H.R. 4563 Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (statement of John R. Phillips, Esq.).
228. "Congressional intent [in the 1986 Amendments] was clear: it sought to expand the
qui tam provisions to 'encourage more private enforcement suits.'" United States ex rel. Er-
ickson v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 917 (E.D. Va. 1989) (citing
1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5288-89).
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1986 Amendments,22 9 it failed to lay an adequate foundation on which
courts could expand the scope of the False Claims Act.2 30 Courts have exac-
erbated the problem by denying qualified relators an opportunity to prose-
cute fraud unknown to the government, and, in the case of the court in Dick,
have gone beyond the language of the statute to impose restrictions not envi-
sioned by Congress.
2 3 1
III. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
In early 1992, Congress introduced two bills to address problems that
have arisen since the enactment of the False Claims Amendments Act of
1986.232 One of the bills, which originated in the House of Representatives,
limits the ability of a government employee to file suit under the Act, rede-
fines the jurisdictional requirements that a relator must meet, and eases cer-
tain restrictions that courts have imposed in the wake of the 1986
Amendments.2 3 3 The other bill, which originated in the Senate, creates a
strict ban on all qui tam suits brought by government employees who base
their actions on information obtained in the course of their government em-
ployment. 234 The Senate bill, clear in its goal, does little to alleviate more
serious questions that have arisen since the enactment of the 1986 Amend-
ments. The House bill, more attuned to the lack of a clear legislative expla-
229. The legislative history of the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 makes clear that
Congress drafted language that would not revisit parasitic suits outlawed under the 1943
Amendments. See 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5278-82. One court commented:
It is evident from reading § 3730(e)(4) that Congress intended to bar parasitic qui
tam suits, that is, lawsuits based on public information. By allowing a relator to
collect money for his role in a qui tam action, the government obviously hopes to
encourage private persons to report incidents of fraud against the government.
United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
230. United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944
F.2d 1149, 163 (3d Cir. 1991) (Scirica, J., dissenting). Judge Scirica noted that "[o]ne diffi-
culty in interpreting the 1986 amendments is that Congress was never completely clear about
what kind of 'parasitic' suits it was attempting to avoid." Id.
231. In reviewing the judicial application of the 1986 Amendments, the House of Repre-
sentatives commented that "[t]he clarifications found in [the proposed legislation] are neces-
sary in light of a number of incorrect interpretations of the parasitic suit ban in the current
Act." H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 12. The report cited the Prudential decision as
an incorrect interpretation of the bar against suits based on public disclosures. "Where the
information is obtained in a purely private proceeding ... it is unlikely that the Government is
aware of the information. In such instances, qui tam lawsuits should be encouraged." Id. at
13. The report also pointed to the Dick court's formulation of the additional requirement that
the relator must have directly or indirectly been a source to the entity that disclosed the allega-
tions. Id. at 15. The report stated that "[tihe [proposed legislation] clarifies that an original
source is not required to be a direct or independent source to the entity that discloses the
allegations." Id. at 14.
232. S. 2785, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 4563, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
233. H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 3.
234. S. 2785, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1992).
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nation behind the changes in the 1986 Amendments, redrafts relevant
language of the statute and goes further toward accomplishing Congress's
1986 goal of creating greater opportunities for qui tam relators.
A. H.R. 4563
The proposed False Claims Amendments Act of 1992, H.R. 4563, seeks
primarily to prevent government employees from filing qui tam suits based
on information learned during their government employment unless they
follow strict notification guidelines.2"' Differing judicial applications of the
False Claims Act requirements for suits brought by government employees
prompted Congress to propose the legislative amendments. 23 6 The bill re-
235. H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 3. The bill amends § 3730(b)(4) by adding a
section that reads:
Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions obtained under [section
3730(b)](3), the Government may move to dismiss from the action the person bring-
ing the action if such person learned of the information that underlies the alleged
violation of section 3729 that is the basis of the action, in the course of the person's
employment by the United States, and the following has not occurred:
(i) In a case in which the employing agency has an Inspector General, such per-
son, before bringing the action-
(I) disclosed in writing substantially all material evidence and information
that relates to the alleged violation and that the person possessed, to such Inspector
General, and
(II) notified in writing the person's supervisor and the Attorney General of
the disclosure under subclause (I).
(ii) In a case in which the employing agency does not have an Inspector General,
such person, before bringing the action-
(I) disclosed in writing substantially all material evidence and information
that relates to the alleged violation and that the person possessed, to the Attorney
General, and
(II) notified in writing the person's supervisor of the disclosure under sub-
clause (I).
(iii) 12 months have elapsed since the disclosure of the information and notifica-
tion under either clause (i) or (ii) were made and the Attorney General has not filed
an action based on the information. Prior to the expiration of such 12-month period
and upon notice to the person who has disclosed information and provided notice
under either clause (i) or (ii), the Attorney General may file a motion seeking an
extension of such 12-month period. Such 12-month period may be extended by a
court for an additional period of not more than 12 months upon a showing by the
Government that the additional period is necessary for the Government to decide
whether or not to file such action. Any such motion may be filed in camera and may
be supported by affidavits or other submissions in camera.
H.R. 4563, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1992).
236. H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 6-7. The report cites decisions in LeBlanc,
Williams and CAC-Ramsay as evidence of the differing judicial interpretations of the False
Claims Act. The report states:
In sum, the courts have rendered at least four different interpretations of the applica-
tion of Section 3730(e)(4) to federal employee suits: (1) permitting all or nearly all
federal employee suits; (2) prohibiting all such suits; (3) permitting them only if the
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quires that the employee disclose the information at least twelve months
prior to the filing of any qui tam suit.2 37 Additionally, the statutory revi-
sions obligate the employee to provide the Inspector General of the em-
ployee's agency with all relevant facts regarding the fraud, and to submit
written notice of the disclosure to the Attorney General and the employee's
supervisor. 238 The government then has twelve months to bring an action
against the offending party, and upon the expiration of the twelve-month
period, a government employee may maintain a qui tam suit by demonstrat-
ing compliance with the disclosure requirements.239
Despite its concentration on suits by government employees, H.R. 4563
addresses the judicial dissension over the jurisdictional limits created by the
1986 Amendments. 2" The bill streamlines the jurisdictional bar language in
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) to prohibit suits based entirely on information disclosed to
the public through reports in the news media, as well as through documents
either created by the government, filed in a lawsuit in which the government
is a party, or relating to an ongoing government investigation.241  The bill
retains the "original source" exception and clarifies it to allow a party to
initiate a suits if he has knowledge of "material facts and allegations" in-
dependent of the restricted sources and has voluntarily disclosed the infor-
mation to the government.242 The bill adds to the current "original source"
federal employee relies on information he discovered but which he was not obliged to
uncover or report; and (4) permitting federal source suits even if the employee relied
on information he did not discover but acquired from government records.
Id. at 7.
237. H.R. 4563, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1992).
238. Id.
239. Id. The proposed legislative changes do not affect the power of the government to
intervene in the qui tam action at a later date. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1988).
240. H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 7; see supra note 233 and accompanying text.
241. H.R. 4563, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1992). As amended, section 3730(e)(4) would
read:
(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under subsection (B)
in which all of the material facts and allegations are obtained from a new media
report or reports, or a disclosure to the general public of a document or documents-
(i) created by the Federal Government;
(ii) filed in a lawsuit to which the Federal Government is a party; or
(iii) relating to an open and active investigation by the Federal Government; un-
less the person bringing the action is an original source of such facts and allegations.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, an individual is an "original source" of mate-
rial facts and allegations if such individual has knowledge, independent from the
sources listed in subparagraph (A), of such facts and allegations and has voluntarily
provided them to the government. The person bringing the action shall also be con-
sidered an original source of any material facts or allegations developed as a result of
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language the assurance that a party will not be barred under the statute in
instances where the government develops the information disclosed by the
individual to construct a larger case against the fraudulent party.
243
In a report on the bill, Congress reasserts that the False Claims Act is
intended to bar only those suits where the government was actively pursuing
the prosecution of fraud. 2 ' The 1986 Amendments sought to encourage
suits where the government had no knowledge of the fraud or was aware of
the fraud but chose not to act.245 Because courts interpret the 1986 Amend-
ments to impose a rigid jurisdictional bar on otherwise valid suits, Congress
drafted the proposed language of the House bill to reestablish the Act's pri-
mary intent.2 46 The proposed bill seeks to express more clearly the extent of
the Act's jurisdictional boundaries, which was poorly developed in the 1986
Amendments, 24 7 and to restore the Act's primary function as a mechanism
for exposing fraud unknown to the government.248
B. S. 2785
The Senate counterpart to the House bill, S. 2785, contains a more limited
purpose. The bill adds language to the existing False Claims statute to pro-
hibit qui tam suits brought by government employees who base their suit on
information obtained during the course of their government employment.
2 49
243. Id.
244. H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 12. The report cites the Dean decision as an
example of the overextension of the ban by the courts, stating that "[tihese results are contrary
to the basic purpose of the jurisdictional ban." Id.
245. The primary purpose of the qui tam action is to provide the government with an
additional weapon to combat fraud unknown or undiscovered by its own sources. See 1986
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5266-67. The 1986 Amendments contained a secondary
goal in ensuring that those who committed fraud would be prosecuted under the False Claims
Act. One of the 1986 Amendments' authors stated:
[T]here may be many cases where evidence is somewhere in the hands of some Gov-
ernment official, even if the Government does not have the evidence in organized
form or even knows it has the information. [The 1986 Amendments] allow[] the
court to dismiss a citizen's action brought upon evidence previously disclosed under
certain circumstances, but also provide[] that the court shall permit the suit if the
Government was aware of the information for 6 months and took no action.
132 CONG. REC. 22340 (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 660, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
22-23 (1986).
246. See H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 14. The House report states that "the
amendments ...will increase incentives for bringing qui tam actions and remove barriers
against their more widespread use." Id.
247. See supra notes 223, 240 and accompanying text.
248. See H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 10. "Where the Government is not even
aware of the information, or where it has the information in its possession but is declining to
pursue any claim, qui tam suits should not be barred." Id. at 12.
249. The proposed revisions states: "No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under
subsection (b) of this section that is based, in whole or in part, upon information obtained in
the course or scope of government employment." S. 2785, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1992).
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The Senate developed the bill in reaction to the Williams251 and Hagood
25 1
decisions, which both allowed government employee relators to maintain
successful suits using information learned through their employment. 252 No
additional substantive changes are made to the existing statutory language.
IV. THE 1992 AMENDMENTS TO THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: CREATING
SHORT-TERM SOLUTIONS FOR LONG-TERM PROBLEMS
The proposed legislative amendments to the False Claims Act take a reac-
tive stance to the problems that have arisen since the 1986 Amendments
rather than addressing more fundamental and substantive difficulties of the
Act. Proposed changes to the qualifying language of § 3730(e)(4) and re-
strictions imposed on government employees focus on areas of judicial dis-
sension created by the 1986 Amendments. But the resurrection of the False
Claims Act in 1986 altered the role of the private citizen in combatting fraud
against the federal government by granting more prosecutorial power to the
qui tam relator.253 The 1986 Amendments restructured the False Claims
Act to create incentives for private citizens that neither Congress nor the
federal government could foresee, and the proposed legislation fails to re-
spond to the changes in the relationship between the relator and the federal
government.
Qui tam suits brought by government employees who use information
learned during the course of their government employment have been a ma-
jor impetus to the revisions of the False Claims Act.254 Suits by government
employees under the False Claims Act, which have been widely litigated and
generally upheld, have encountered strong resistance from the federal gov-
ernment.25 5 Both the House and Senate bills reflect the views of the federal
250. United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
251. United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416 (9th
Cir. 1991).
252. Senator Thurmond, sponsor of the bill, remarked that "[t]he problem that this bill
addresses is that Federal courts have determined that Government employees may also file 'qui
tam' suits and share in the recovery." 138 CONG. REC. S7217 (daily ed. May 21, 1992) (state-
ment of Sen. Thurmond).
253. See infra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
254. The House of Representatives proposed H.R. 4563 "to amend the False Claims Act to
provide certain limitations on Federal employees filing qui tam actions." H.R. REP. No. 837,
supra note 16, at 1. The Senate bill seeks to "correct[] several Federal court decisions which
have held that the False Claims Act permits Government employees to file Government fraud
law suits for a personal reward of up to 30 percent of the Government's recovery." 138 CONG.
REC. S7217 (daily ed. May 21, 1992) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
255. See Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1417; United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d
1493, 1494 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1159
(S.D. Fla. 1990). The argument of the Federal Government in Hagood to dismiss Hagood as
relator is typical of the government's stance in such suits:
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government in opposition to government employees as qui tam relators,25 6
and impose severe restrictions on suits initiated by government employees
under the Act.2 57 The bills have the practical effect of eviscerating the po-
tential of the government employee as guardian against fraud and reducing
the incentive to pursue false claims.258
Apart from the proposed changes to the Act affecting government em-
ployees, the House bill addresses practical concerns associated with qui tam
suits. H.R. 4563 attempts to alleviate adverse judicial decisions on public
disclosures under the Act by reasserting that the jurisdictional bar of § 3730
applies to only two types of actions: public disclosures through the news
media or through the release to the general public of documents created
either by the government, relating to an open and active government investi-
gation, or filed in a lawsuit to which the government is a party. 259 The bill is
directed at decisions such as United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin &
Bustamante v. Prudential Insurance Co. ,260 in which the court barred the
relator's suit because the information was derived from a "civil hearing.'
26 1
H.R. 4563 would permit the suit because the information upon which the
The United States argues that when Hagood became involved in preparation of the
disputed contract he was engaged in an "administrative investigation," so that the
words of the statutory exclusion [of § 3730(e)(4)] are met. The United States further
argues that the "public disclosure" required by the statute occurred when Hagood as
a government employee "disclosed" to himself as a member of the public the infor-
mation on which he based his suit.
Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1419.
256. The House report summarizes the testimony of government witness against qui tam
suits by government employees:
They said that permitting such suits undermined the incentive for such employees to
report all evidence of fraud to responsible government officials; that there were nu-
merous avenues to encourage such reports; and that government employee cases do
not add to the Government's knowledge of illegal behavior since the employees' in-
formation can be considered to be already in the hands of the Government under
principles of agency. They argued that current employees of the Government would
compete in a race to the courthouse, undermine government investigations that were
not yet ripe, and obtain compensation in cases that the Government was pursuing
with vigor.
H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 8-9.
257. See supra notes 236-39, 249-52 and accompanying text.
258. The House bill requires that the employee screen all potential suits with an inspector
general or other government official, and then imposes a twelve-month waiting period on the
employee to file suit. H.R. 4563 at § 2. The Senate bill creates a strict jurisdictional bar that
prohibits all suits based on information learned during the course of government employment.
S. 2785 at § 3.
259. H.R. 4563 at § 3. The House report states that the purpose of the Act "is to prohibit
qui tam lawsuits only in those instances where it is clear that the Government is already pursu-
ing a proceeding based on the fraud in questions." H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 12.
260. 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991).
261. Id. at 1156-57.
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relator based his suit was not known to the general public, nor was the gov-
ernment a party to the suit from which the relator obtained the informa-
tion.262 H.R. 4563 specifically targets an overly restrictive reading of the
jurisdictional bar so as to encourage private parties to expose fraud other-
wise unknown to the government.
2 63
The bill revises the "original source" language to eliminate confusion over
additional court-imposed requirements that the relator must meet to gain
standing under the Act.264 The House report on H.R. 4563 emphasizes that
a court will consider the "original source" exception only when the informa-
tion upon which the suit is based falls within the prohibited categories of §
3730(e)(4)(A). 265 The revised statute would no longer require that the rela-
tor have "direct and independent knowledge" of the false claims, instead
mandating that the suit not be parasitic.266 The statute consistently employs
the term "material facts and allegations" to prevent a requirement similar to
the one imposed by the court in Dick 267 that the relator have directly or
indirectly been a source to the entity that disclosed the information.
2 68
The revisions to the "public disclosure" and "original source" language
do not cure all difficulties arising from application of the False Claims Act.
The proposed language of H.R. 4563 revisits old problems associated with
qui tam suits under the Act. The requirement that the jurisdictional bar of
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) apply to actions in which "all material facts and allega-
tions '' 269 upon prohibited sources creates the opportunity for uneven judicial
interpretation. The bill would apparently authorize an action by a relator
who begins with publicly disclosed information and supplements it with
other facts and allegations. 270 The result could be the statutory authoriza-
tion of qui tam suits that closely resemble the parasitic suits upheld under
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess271 and banned under the 1943 Amend-
262. Id. at 1151-52.
263. "Where the information is obtained in a purely private proceeding ... it is unlikely
that the Government is aware of the information. In such circumstances, qui tam lawsuits
should be encouraged." H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 13.
264. Id. at 14-15.
265. "[T]he question of whether the relator is an 'original source' arises only after it has
been determined that the case is otherwise parasitic under section 3730(3)(4)." Id. at 14
266. Id.
267. United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990).
268. H.R. 4563 at § 3. The House report states that the proposed language is aimed at
"eliminating any textual difference that might be inferred from the distinction between 'allega-
tions or transactions' and 'information.' " H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 14.
269. H.R. 4563 at § 3.
270. The House report states that "[a] False Claims action which is developed from 'facts'
derived from public sources, such as documents obtained through Freedom of Information
Act requests, is not a 'parasitic lawsuit' that this provision is intended to bar." H.R. REP. No.
837, supra note 16, at 13.
271. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
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ments.272 Second, the House bill provides the federal government with a
potential escape mechanism for documents "relating to an open and active
investigation by the government., 273 For example, in grand jury investiga-
tions, during which the government withholds information from the general
public, the qui tam relator may not be cognizant of active government inves-
tigations on false claims and later find that the suit is barred because the
information upon which the suit is based is a "public disclosure" under the
Act.
274
The proposed House bill does include measures that address to a limited
degree tensions underlying the False Claims Act that have developed as a
result of the 1986 Amendments.275 Throughout the statute's history there
has been the need to balance the right of the federal government to retain
sufficient power to prosecute fraud successfully against the need to en-
courage the private citizen to act as a surrogate of the federal government to
locate fraud.27 6 The 1986 Amendments, which lowered the standards to
bring a suit, inadvertently shifted the balance in favor of the private rela-
tor.2 77 In amending the Act in 1986, Congress created a catalyst for an
272. In the Marcus case, "[tihe government argued that the informer's qui tam action
should be barred because he brought no information of his own to the suit." United States ex
rel. Erickson v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 916 (E.D. Va. 1989).
Congress responded by amending the False Claims Act to bar suits based on information in
possession of the government. False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608-09 (1943).
The 1986 Amendments eased the restrictions by incorporating four specific exclusions, includ-
ing the "original source" language. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3157 (1986). The amendments proposed in H.R. 4563 would allow
the relator to base a suit on publicly disclosed information as long as the federal government is
not a source. See H.R. 4563 at § 3.
273. H.R. 4563 at § 3.
274. A statement in the House report reinforces the probability that a qui tam relator's
action may be preempted by an ongoing government action:
Special note should be taken that the [Judiciary] Committee intends the bar on suits
based on disclosure to the general public of a document or documents "relating to an
open and active investigation by the Federal Government" to be strictly con-
strued .... Only where the document that is the basis of the suit is disclosed to the
general public from an investigation that is part of a good faith effort to bring about a
prosecution of the Government's claim in the near future should a suit based on such
a disclosure be barred.
H.R. REP. No. 837, supra note 16, at 13.
275. See infra notes 276-82 and accompanying text.
276. The legislative history of the 1986 Amendments notes that Congress intended to en-
courage an increased number of qui tam suits by private relators but sought to ensure that the
federal government would not encounter interference in ongoing criminal investigations. 1986
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5288-89. "While the [Judiciary] Committee does not expect
that disclosures from private false claims suits would often interfere with sensitive investiga-
tions, we recognize the necessity for some coordination of disclosures in civil proceedings in
order to protect the Government's interest in criminal matters." Id. at 5289.
277. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield, Inc. 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (interpreting the False Claims Act to
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increased number of suits by private citizens who employ the qui tam statute
as a device for monetary gain or revenge against an employer. 278 The result
has been the creation of a class of private "attorneys general" who determine
which false claims will be pursued.2 79 The increase in qui tam actions has
strained the resources of the federal government, 280 and forced the Justice
Department to take a reactive posture to screen the suits in deciding whether
to intervene, rather than focusing on its own investigations of fraud.28 ' The
proposed House bill restores more discretionary power to the federal govern-
ment, but qui tam suits under the False Claims Act remain "tools of the
allow use of information learned during civil discovery as the basis of a qui tam suit); United
States ex rel. Erickson v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Va.
1989) (allowing a qui tam suit brought by a government employee).
278. Some commentators have remarked that the 1986 Amendments have "created a mod-
em class of bounty hunters, made up largely of disgruntled or well-meaning but ill-informed
employees .... There is no question that over the last few years more and more employees
have used the law to point the finger at their employers." Richard W. Stevenson, Workers
Wo Turn In Bosses Use Law to Seek Big Rewards, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1989, at Al, C3.
Another commentator called the False Claims Act "'nothing but a treasure chest for unthink-
ing scourges of the defense industry.'" Steve France, The Private War on Pentagon Fraud,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 46.
279. The 1986 Amendments, because of relaxed jurisdictional requirements and filing pro-
cedures, allow the private relator a greater level of discretion in proceeding with a claim. Ste-
venson, supra note 278, at C3. One commentator noted that "'[t]here is something basically
wrong about having private individuals operating their own 'off-the-shelf' private Justice De-
partments.' " France, supra note 278, at 46.
280. In the wake of the 1986 Amendments, 33 suits were filed under the Act in fiscal year
(FY) 1987, 60 suits in FY 1988, 93 suits in FY 1989, and in excess of 100 in FY 1990. Hear-
ings, supra note 16, at 3. By 1990, the number of Justice Department attorneys working on qui
tam suits had grown from 29 to 42, spending approximately 11,000 hours in a six-month
period. Id. at 4-5.
281. Many members of the Justice Department believe that the 1986 Amendments "in-
trude[] on the department's ability to set its own investigative priorities and that [the 1986
Amendments] force[] the department to spend considerable time investigating groundless
claims." Stevenson, supra note 278, at C3. Stuart M. Gerson, an Assistant Attorney General
at the Justice Department, stated:
One problematic aspect of qui tam litigation is that the Executive Branch no
longer is exclusively able to set the priorities for its investigations. Upon receiving a
qui tam complaint we ask for a recommendation from the affected agency and this
will usually require an investigation. Because of the statutory deadlines on the gov-
ernment's decisions, managers of agency investigative resources have lost flexibility
in deciding which investigations should be conducted and in what order.
Likewise, we had always thought that the government's right to investigate after a
qui tam complaint was filed was for the government's benefit, to aid in its decision on
whether to proceed with the case or let the relator proceed, and to help determine
how extensive an investigation to conduct. Accordingly, we believed the scope and
nature of such investigation was within the discretion of the Department.
Hearings, supra note 16, at 7-8.
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private litigant" rather than a "weapon in the federal government's arsenal
in the fight against fraud.
28 2
The Senate bill, reacting against judicial decisions that have generally sup-
ported the standing of government employees under the False Claims Act as
qui tam relators, ignores the majority of problems that have arisen since the
1986 Amendments. Documents accompanying the bill stress the detrimental
impact that suits by government employees have on the federal government's
efforts to combat fraud.2 3 As reviewing courts have noted, government em-
ployees do not possess split personalities, half government employee and half
public citizen.284 If the government refuses to act on evidence of false claims
known by a government employee, even if learned during the course of em-
ployment, the employee should be entitled to proceed in the initiation of a
qui tam suit under the Act. H.R. 4563's twelve-month statutory restriction
on suits better addresses the rights of the government employee as it ensures
that the federal government will have the primary opportunity to prosecute
the wrongdoer.2 85
V. CONCLUSION
The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 attempted to achieve the dual
goals of retaining traditional government controls on qui tam actions and
282. One of the major complaints of government attorneys is the six-month period in
which the government must decide to intervene or allow the relator to proceed. Hearings,
supra note 16, at 5-6. H.R. 4563 imposes a one year waiting period on government employees
bringing suit under the Act and allows the government to seek a twelve-month extension upon
good showing. H.R. 4563 at § 2. The bill, however, does not grant the government the ability
to delay judicial proceedings instituted by non-government employees.
283. Senator Thurmond, author of S. 1562, stated:
Clearly, Government employees who fortuitously happen to be working on fraud
cases and manage to rush to the courthouse first, should not be permitted to divert
millions of dollars from the Treasury for their own personal gain. When the Con-
gress amended the False Claims Act in 1986, it surely did not intend to give Govern-
ment employees this type of windfall for performing their Government jobs.
138 CONG. REC. S7217 (daily ed. May 21, 1992) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
284. The federal government has argued against allowing qui tam suits by government
employees on the theory that a public disclosure of information occurs when a government
employee files suit under the Act. See United States ex reL. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water
Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1991); United States ex reL. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co.,
913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 1312 (1991). The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals responded:
The notion that we should subdivide Hagood into his governmental self and his non-
governmental self is too metaphysical a contention for the interpretation of a plain
congressional enactment. Hagood does not base his suit on any public disclosure
made to him or to anyone else. He bases his suit on information that he acquired in
preparing the contract; the information was not publicly disclosed.
Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1419.
285. H.R. 4563 at § 2.
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encouraging private citizens to expose cases of fraud unknown to the govern-
ment. Federal courts applying the post-1986 False Claims Act have devi-
ated from the intent of Congress by excluding qualified relators to bring qui
tam suits while allowing certain actions and relators previously forbidden
under the Act. Rather than create broader opportunities under the False
Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments have generated dissension and statutory
revision by the federal courts.
The need for legislative revision to the False Claims Act is crucial for its
effective implementation to yoke the assistance of private citizens to counter
fraud against the government. The proposed House bill approaches the
problem by revising relevant language, which should give clearer guidance to
federal courts in handling qui tam suits under the False Claims Act. The
proposed amendments fail, however, to restore adequate control to the fed-
eral government to ensure that qui tam actions adhere to the original intent
of Congress. Congress must act to announce clear legislative guidelines of
the False Claims Act that emphasize the mutual goal of the federal govern-
ment and the private relator in prosecuting government fraud.
Francis E. Purcell, Jr.
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